(Concluded From Last Issue)

The Federal Reserve Board's definition, contained in its interpretive regulations on the Act - Regulation Z - goes but a little further: a creditor is one "who in the ordinary course of business" regularly extends credit. 12C.F.R.§226.2(m)(1973).

The legislative history, though sparse on this point, is of some help. In both the House and Senate reports, the only comment relevant to the definition of creditor indicates that the term is to have a broad scope. "Thus a small retailer who extended credit . . . in an isolated instance to accommodate a particular customer would not be covered (by the Act)." H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1968); S. Rep. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1967). 1968 U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 1962. Reading this along with the definitions in the statute and Regulation Z, the intent seems to have been to except from the Act only those lenders whose extensions of credit are an occasional, isolated, and incidental portion of their business.

Informal letters, issued by the -.,3ff of the Federal Reserve Board, are a further indication that the term "creditor" should be expansively read. While these letters are hardly binding on a court, they do represent an "experience(d) and informed judgment to which courts ... may properly resort for guidance." In one letter, for example, a homeowner was advised that he would not be a creditor simply because he accepted a mortgage in the sole of his own home. Letter from Milton W. Schober, Ass't. Director. Nov. 4, 1969, reported at 4 CCH Consum. Credit Guide 30,326. More importantly, a 1970 staff letter opined that a corporation, distributing its stock on credit, would be a creditor for purposes of disclosing the credit terms of the sole. "(0t appears to us that the restriction of the application of the Act. to 'creditors' was included merely because of the unfairness in placing a burden on a private party to make disclosures in connection with his casual isolated sales."

The Truth in Lending Act is a remedia statute designed as much as permissible to permit borrowers to make informed judgments about the use of credit. To effectuate this congressional purpose requires that the Act's terms be liberally construed ... Here, realty sales were a significant aspect of appellant's business. And in nearly half its sales, it extended credit to its customers. They were credit transactions involving a large amount of money and not, after all, like granting credit for a bag of groceries. In view of this, we cannot say Reb Realty's extensions of credit were the type of isolated and incidental transactions the definition of creditor was meant to exempt.

To hold otherwise would undermine the remedial objective of the statute. Undoubtedly, a considerable number of land sales are effected by real estate brokers acting as sellers, and in a large percentage of those' the broker must, in this age of credit ' either provide credit or arrange for its extension, both of which may subject the lender to the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). To except appellant here, then, might well insulate a significant credit market from the Act.

Finally, an additional factor influencing our decision is that a real estate broker like appellant is unlikely to be unduly burdened or surprised by the Act's mandates. Probably one reason Congress exempted those not regularly extending credit from the Act was that such persons could not be expected to know the low or be able, without considerable trouble, to follow its directives. Real estate brokers constantly deal with credit, either as principals or in assisting purchasers. They are, therefore, likely to be familiar with the general requirements of the Act and to be capable of implementing its requirements.

Judgment affirmed.

-From Narello News